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Executive Summary 
 
 
The Secretary of the Senate Economics Legislative Committee on Banking 
Amendment (Delivering Essential Financial Services for the Community) Bill  
advised that the Committee is interested in having a submission from me on 
the guarantee scheme.  Accordingly, I am making this submission.  
The Bill proposes four proposals, that is, introduction of fee free basic 
account, ATM fees changes, introduction of fixed interest gap mortgages and 
full disclosure of termination fees. I have addressed each of these proposals, 
provided relevant analysis and summarized my opinion. 
As for the first proposal of introduction of fee free basic account while the 
proposal seems appealing, one can’t altogether to ignore the provider’s 
perspective. I compare the features of ‘no-frills’ account offered by the HSBC 
bank in India with the features of the basic bank account proposed in the 
Bill.  While I support the proposal in the Bill, I believe some flexibility would 
need to be given to providers. 
The second proposal seems to do away with ATM fees and bring the 
Australian ATM charging system in line with that prevailing in the UK and 
France in so far as basic accounts are concerned.  However, it is possible 
that bank customer would open multiple bank accounts including a basic 
account so as to take advantage of the fee free, penalty free, ATM usage 
free account.  Also ATM providers would have to recover the capital and 
operational cost of the ATM from some other sources.  I provide support to 
this proposal with a caveat. 
The third and the fourth proposal are straight forward and I support these.  
For proposal three, I suggest that we use official cash rate as the benchmark 
rate though. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Bill is aims at introducing a ‘no-frills’ or basic bank account, changes in 
ATM fees, fixed interest gap mortgages and disclosure of early termination 
fees.  The Bill raises several issues. My comments on each of the proposals 
in the Bill are recorded below: 
 
2.  Analysis of the proposals in the Bill 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bill proposes that banks introduce a basic account which should have 
certain features like provision of deposit, withdrawal and transfer services, 
internet access, ATM card or EFTPOS card linked to the account a debit card 
linked to the account suitable for use in credit card transactions; free of:  
ongoing service fees such as monthly account service fees; and penalty fees 
for actions and transgressions of third parties; and free of any penalty fee 
for a breach of a term of the contract by the account-holder.  
 
Analysis of Proposal 1: 
 
What the Bill has proposed is introduction of what are known as ‘no-frills’ 
bank accounts.  For example, the HSBC bank offers such an account in the 
Indian banking market.  It will be interesting therefore to compare the 
features of the HSBC ‘no-frills’ account with the basic account proposed in 
the Bill.  Such a comparison has been attempted in attached Table 1. The 
features of the HSBC ‘no-frills’ accounts are available online 
(http://www.hsbc.co.in/1/2/personal/bank-accounts/accounts-service-
charges-and-fees#frills).   
 
Comments on Proposal 1: 
 
As can be seen from the table, the proposal is seeking more concessions 
from banks for Australian consumers than the deal available to consumers in 
India.  To be realistic even if Australian consumers could get a deal similar to 
what the Indians have, then in my opinion, it would be a great step forward. 
 
I support the proposal of introduction of ‘no-frills’ bank account with features 
as outlined in the Bill.  However, some flexibility would need to be accorded 
to the providers so that they are not short-changed in the process. 
 
Proposal 1: Part I (section 2 to 6): Introduction of Basic Account 
 
Page 4 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Under these sections, the Bill seeks that (a) usage of own-branded ATMs 
should be fee free for account holders of the ATM card issuing bank (ACIB) 
and (b) the fee free usage of foreign ATMs by its own customers and by 
customers of other banks of its own ATM, that is, on a reciprocal basis.  It 
also proposes certain stringent requirements before levying of fee for ATM 
usage by any bank for its own or ‘foreign’ customers such as applying to 
APRA and getting express permission to do so. 
 
Analysis of Proposal 2: 
 
The above proposal seeks to create a system of ATM usage which is similar 
to the UK and France where banks don’t levy any usage fee.  Since the 
introduction of interchange fee reforms, in Australia, customers pay a 
‘foreign fee’ for using an ATM of another bank.   
 
Pricing of ATM usage involves two sets of costs: wholesale level and retail 
level.  At the wholesale level, banks could decide among themselves the 
interchange fee to be charged.  This could, however, lead to collusion as the 
fees aren’t transparent.  Consequently, in Australia and South Africa 
regulators replaced ‘interchange fee’ with ‘direct charging system’ in which a 
fee is levied on customers for ‘foreign ATM’ usage.   
 
Countries like the US and Canada charge card holders twice, that is a usage 
fee as well as a surcharge for ‘foreign ATM’ usage.  Though the cost of such 
double dipping has been found to be high (approx USD 3)  by Hayashi et al 
(2006), the ATM providers claim that it has allowed them to expand 
provision of ATMs leading to more convenience to the customers and 
consequent lesser transaction costs. 
 
Latest statistics by the Bank for International Settlement seems to confirm 
the above claim as can be seen from Table 2 below: 
 
  
Proposal 2: Part I (7 to 10): ATM fees 
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Table 2: Number of terminals per million inhabitants 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Canada 1627 1700 1748 1799  
US 1334 1318 1355 1336  
UK 968 998 1040 1041  
Australia 1151 1189 1219 1194 1235 
 
(Source: For Canada, US and UK- BIS Statistical Tables. For Australia: 
Author’s calculations. ATM numbers are obtained from Australian bankers 
association website. Population figures in million from ABS catalogue 3101. 
20.394 (2005), 20.697 (2006), 21.072 (2007), 21.498 (2008) and 21.955 
(2009)). 
Table 3: Growth of ATMs in Australia 
 
Jun-05 23,472 8.9% 
Jun-06 24,616 4.9% 
Jun-07 25,681 4.3% 
Jun-08 25,658 -0.1% 
Jun-09 27,108 5.7% 
 
(Source: Australian Bankers’ Association website) 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, countries like Canada, US (except 2008) have 
which follow the direct charging system have shown a rise in ATM numbers 
while in UK where ATM transactions are free the ATM numbers appear to be 
stagnated.  In Australia, after introduction of direct charging regime the 
number has significantly increased to 1235 per million inhabitants.  Removal 
of direct charging may have adverse consequences for consumer welfare in 
terms of higher transaction costs.   
 
A study by Donze and Dubec (2009) present a mathematical model (not 
empirical) that classifies three different regimes as under: 
 
Regime I: Full prohibition: ATM usage fees are prohibited (that is fee usage 
for customers). Banks typically charge account keeping fee to customers (as 
in UK and France) 
 
Regime II: Partial Prohibition:  that is only surcharges are prohibited (as in 
Australia and South Africa)  
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Regime III: No prohibition: The case with foreign fees and surcharges (as in 
the US and Canada). 
 
These authors find that ‘regime one is the most profitable for banks and the 
worst for consumers because the collusive power of the interchange fee is 
only limited by the participation constraint of the marginal consumer’ 
(Donze and Dubec, 2009, p. 603).  The authors state that the mathematical 
model is consistent with empirical study by Knittel and Stango (2009) based 
on US data. 
 
In effect what the Bill proposes is that in respect of basic account banks 
switch back to Regime I, but at the same time NOT charge any account 
keeping fee.   The proposal is likely to erode bank profits and may meet with 
vehement opposition from the banks.   
 
There could be two ways out of this situation for banks: 
A. If we accept the Bill as it is consumer may have to agree to keep 
prescribed minimum account balances interest free.  This hard core in 
the account would give opportunities for the banks to utilize the idle 
cash in profitable ventures and thus subsidize the cost incurred on 
provision of a fee free basic account. 
B. To load the cost of running the ‘fee free’ basic accounts on ‘non fee 
free’ basic accounts. 
 
One difficulty with the Bill is that it doesn’t stop ‘with fee’ account holders 
from opening ‘fee free’ account and use the ‘fee free account’ for ATM 
purposes.   
 
If the objective is to help socio-economically vulnerable customers then it 
may be necessary to restrict the basic account opening only for customers 
with income below a certain threshold.  It may be easier to administer this 
for salaried consumers but harder for non-salaried consumers.   
 
Comments on Proposal 2: 
 
The proposal is frost with several practical difficulties as outlined above.  It 
may be easier to get a concession from banks if the basic account is 
restricted to socio-economically vulnerable group of consumers only. I would 
support the proposed arrangement for such groups. 
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To offer fixed interest gap mortgages to existing and prospective customers; 
and to develop its own formula for the benchmark base rate that it will offer 
to customers under a fixed interest gap mortgage. 
Analysis of proposal 3: 
The idea here seems to be to offer fixed interest gap mortgages for the life 
of the loan.  Currently, banks offer fixed interest mortgage loans for say 3 to 
5 years.  While fixing the rate banks do take into account their benchmark 
base rate and the refinancing risk premium.  They also take into account the 
likely changes in the official cash rate.  Compared to variable rate loans, 
bank would make a loss in advancing fixed rate loan if the variable interest 
rates rise. Consequently, banks would take into account several factors 
before agreeing for a fixed interest mortgage. 
Instead of asking the bank to develop its own formula for the benchmark 
rate (which the banks would already have), it would make more sense if the 
fixed interest gap rate mortgage is related to the official cash rate. For 
example, the standard variable mortgage rate used to be 180 basis points 
(or 1.80 percent) above the official cash rate for many long years.  During 
the crisis however the gap has widened to 280 basis points.  Currently the 
gap is 290 basis points1. Even when official cash rate was falling banks 
refused to pass on full reduction in the official cash rate to mortgage 
borrowers.  However, when official cash rate started rising banks increased 
mortgage rates beyond the official cash rate rise.  In both circumstances, 
banks cited rising funding cost as the reason. 
Comment on proposal 3: 
I support the proposal with an amendment that the base benchmark rate 
needs to be the official cash rate rather than the rate decided by the banks 
themselves. 
I would particularly support the proposal for members of the society that 
belong to the socio-economically vulnerable groups.   
                                                          
1
 The standard variable home loan rate in June 2010 was 7.40 per cent.  The cash rate was 4.50 per cent (source: 
RBA statistical tables Table F5. Available online at RBA website).  Accordingly, the gap is 290 basis points.  
Proposal 3: Part 2 (2):  Fixed Interest Gap Mortgages 
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The Bill proposes that early termination fees be fully disclosed up front. 
 
 
Analysis of proposal 4 
 
Any party entering into a contract should be fully aware of the financial and 
other implications of signing up of the contract.   
 
Another issue though not raised in the Bill is the product disclosure 
statements sent to consumers under the Financial Services Reform Act 2001. 
It is easily possible to hide important details in a maze of information. 
 
Service providers be mandated to provide an executive summary highlights 
of the product disclosure statement.  Just as in all legislations, the contents 
in brief are presented up front similar arrangements should be put in place 
so that the consumer is aware of what s/he is signing for. 
 
 
Comment on proposal 4: 
 
I fully support the full disclosure of early termination fees upfront as 
proposed in the Bill.     
 
As a matter of fact in my submission to the Senate Inquiries on Bank 
Guarantee and Banking Act Amendment (Keeping Banks Accountable) Bill, I 
suggested that all fees, funding costs and lending rates should be fully 
disclosed by banks and that RBA and APRA should collect this information 
and make it publicly available periodically.   The Senate Inquiry was kind 
enough to accept that suggestion which is included in the final report.  I 
reiterate this again. 
 
  
Proposal 4:  Part 3—Exit fees on mortgages 
 
Page 9 
 
  
 
3. Summary 
I fully support the disclosure of termination fee. I also support the fixed 
interest gap mortgage with a suggestion to use official cash rate as the 
benchmark rate.  As for ATM fees and basic bank account, the proposals are 
frost with several difficulties. These have been discussed and possible line of 
action has been suggested.  
 Page 
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